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Introduction: John Higley’s Work on Elite 
Foundations of Social Theory and Politics 
Jan Pakulski  
Abstract: »Elitetheoretische Grundlagen sozialwissenschaftlicher Theoriebil-
dung und politischer Analyse«. John Higley’s work traverses the boundaries of 
sociology, history and politics in the best tradition of classical social theory, 
and it has inspired countless scholars across Europe, North America, Australia 
and Asia. This inspiration has worked on three fronts: paradigmatic, theoretical 
and empirical. Higley and his colleagues revived the “elite paradigm” focusing 
on top national power-holders, where elites are seen as the key social actors 
and agents of social and political change. An interest in elite theory was also 
stimulated by his work, especially with respect to the relationship between the 
key characteristics of national elites, such as their integration and consensus, 
and the nature (democratic or otherwise) of political regimes. This theoretical 
work inspired numerous critical analyses of elite transformations that precipi-
tated the post-WWII “halcyon years” of stability and growth in Europe and 
North America, the liberal-democratic transformations in post-communist 
Europe, as well as the recent turbulences: the financial crisis and a prolonged 
economic slowdown. The work of Higley and colleagues also continues to in-
spire a revival of macro-theoretical interests, especially in the European social 
theory, social-historical research, and theoretically informed political analysis. 
Keywords: elite, elite paradigm, elite theory. 
 
This volume celebrates the work of John Higley and presents contributions 
from fourteen authors who have collaborated with him over the past decades. 
Higley’s work, which traverses the boundaries of sociology, history and poli-
tics in the best tradition of classical social theory, has inspired countless schol-
ars across Europe, North America, Australia and Asia, and there is little doubt 
that he was responsible for reviving the “elite paradigm” after its long eclipse 
following the collapse of European democracies in the 1920s-30s (paradoxi-
cally, the very development anticipated by classical elite theorists).  
This recovery cum reappraisal, which took “elitism” or the “elite perspec-
tive” as a meta-theoretical paradigm focusing on top national power-holders, 
where elites are seen as the key social actors and agents of social and political 
change, started with a “manifesto” of the elite perspective written with Field in 
the early 1970s (Field and Higley 1973). This was followed by the influential 
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Elitism (Field and Higley 1980) and by contributions on elite integration, set-
tlement and transition (Burton and Higley 1987; Higley and Burton 1989; 
Higley et al. 1991; Field, Higley and Burton 1990). It also included influential 
“regional applications” of the elite paradigm in Latin America, Southern 
Europe and newly liberated Central Eastern Europe (CEE) countries (e.g., 
Higley and Gunther 1992; Higley, Pakulski and Wesołowski 1998; Dogan and 
Higley 1998; Higley and Pakulski 2000). A major re-statement of the elitist 
framework, Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy, was published in 2006 in 
collaboration with Michael Burton. Finally, Higley recently co-edited a number 
of critical reappraisals of the paradigm of democratic elitism (Best and Higley 
2009; Best and Higley 2010). In their focus, Higley’s publications combine 
theoretical reflection – mainly inspired by European classical elite theorists – 
and empirical research, in which he has been involved for half a century. 
Elitism’s core tenets are deceptively simple. Due to their strategic positions 
and resources under their control, elites – that is, small groups of “persons who 
are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations and 
movements, to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially” (Higley 
and Burton 2006, 7) – have the power that the majority of people or non-elites 
lack, and they make systematic use of their power in both democratic and non-
democratic polities. However, while power is portrayed by elitists as concen-
trated in elite hands and exercised in the top-down manner, even in the modern 
democratic regimes, the elite perspective does not dismiss non-elites as incon-
sequential or powerless. This is because elites are always constrained by non-
elite orientations and preferences, which they – the elite members – have to 
shape and cultivate to sustain their rule, even if they act in an autonomous way. 
As Higley and Burton (2006, 27) remind us, the power-holders must cultivate 
mass support and “frame their appeals to accord with the interests and political 
orientations of non-elites”.  
While focusing in empirical studies on the variation in national elite charac-
teristics, the consequences of this variation for the nature of regimes, and on 
the historical patterns of elite change, Higley and his colleagues have also 
further elaborated the elitist paradigm, especially its “democratic” version 
(originally outlined by Weber and Schumpeter) that reconciles elitism with 
democracy (e.g., Best and Higley 2009; 2010). Elites, according to “democratic 
elitism” are the key builders and defenders (but also destroyers) of democratic 
regimes. Those national elites that reach a ruling consensus and respect open 
electoral competition for the executive leadership in the state are able to sustain 
democracy. Moreover, as demonstrated by the “third wave” of democratisation, 
especially in CEE following the collapse of Soviet communism, elites can 
“craft” and “consolidate” democratic regimes, even under very difficult condi-
tions of social conflicts, political instability and economic woes (e.g., Higley, 
Pakulski and Wesolowski 1998; Higley, Kullberg and Pakulski 1996; Higley 
and Lengyel 2000). 
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Perhaps the major theoretical contribution made by John Higley – or at least 
the one most closely associated with his name – is encapsulated in the now 
widely known claim on the relationship between the key characteristics of 
national elites, such as their integration and consensus on the nature (democ-
ratic or otherwise) of political regimes. His books and articles are widely ac-
claimed not only as “manifestos” of elitism, but also as theoretical milestones 
offering a historically sweeping but well substantiated vision of modern liberal 
democracy as a product of broadly integrated and consensually united national 
elites (e.g., Higley, Deacon and Smart 1979). Such elites formed initially only 
in Western Europe and North America, though they were subsequently emu-
lated worldwide. Equally influential has been Higley’s (and his collaborators) 
work on the transition to democracy and market economy in post-communist 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), including Russia. This transition was pre-
ceded by crises and intense elite circulation, and directed by reformist elites 
that embarked upon a risky path of negotiations and compromises with their 
opponents. These negotiations, popularly known as “roundtables”, paved the 
way for gradual and (largely) peaceful transformations. Diverse outcome of 
these processes, according to Higley’s widely accepted proposition, reflect 
diverse paths of elite transformation to democracy. Above all, they reflect 
diverse patterns of elite integration and outlook. Liberal democratic regimes 
and market economies took root and were consolidated in societies where 
national elites achieved wide integration and broad ruling consensus about the 
rules of political engagement. Divisions and conflicts within national elites, by 
contrast, harbingered political instability combined with the formation of non-
democratic and/or illiberal regimes. Such divisions, Higley suggested, para-
lysed political and economic reforms, thus hindering democratisation and 
European integration. In the USA and Australia, Higley’s theoretical work 
inspired numerous critical analyses of century-long elite transformations that 
precipitated both the post-WWII “halcyon years” of stability and growth, as 
well as the recent turbulences: the financial crisis and a prolonged economic 
slowdown. Above all, Higley’s scholarship inspired a refreshing revival of 
macro-theoretical interests, especially in European social theory, social-
historical research, and theoretically informed political analysis (e.g. Higley 
and Pakulski 2007; Best and Higley 2010; Higley and Pakulski 2012). 
Finally, dozens of empirical studies of elites – their backgrounds, recruit-
ment, structure, orientations, circulation and change – carry a clear imprint of 
Higley’s inspiration. He defined elites in an operational manner as incumbents 
of key power positions (e.g. Higley, Deacon and Smart 1979), thus opening the 
way for a reliable empirical identification of elites through a combination of 
positional, reputational and decisional method. His studies of elites in Norway 
and Australia formed a template for dozens of empirical investigations of na-
tional elites. 
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Indeed, this volume is a testimony to John Higley’s wide-ranging influence 
and inspiration. All contributors to this volume utilize the elite perspective in 
their analyses and address a mixture of theoretical and empirical questions 
about elites and social-political change. The volume opens with G. William 
Domhoff’s “bird’s eye” view of modern elite theory. In its Higley-Burton ren-
dition, it is seen as a “parallel power structure research tradition” and as a theo-
retical partner-supplement to the “four-networks” (or “power networks”) ana-
lytic framework theory of power developed by Michael Mann and applied to 
the United States by Domhoff (e.g. 2009). The “four-networks” theory is seen 
not only as compatible with the modern elite framework, but also as providing 
a more specific historical supplement cum theoretical specification to the gen-
eral power network framework. In a laudatory manner, Domhoff highlights the 
theoretical value of the Higley-Burton claims about the dynamics of elite trans-
formation, especially those historical transformation paths that led to the for-
mation of first democratic regimes: the “post-colonial elite formation and con-
sensus-building”, elite “pacts and settlements” that followed prolonged violent 
confrontations and divisions, and “elite convergences” that allowed internal 
splits and divisions to be overcome. These claims form a platform for a theo-
retical reconciliation not only between elite theory and democratic theory, but 
also between elitism and the “power networks” perspective. 
Domhoff’s paper is followed by an overview by Jan Pakulski of elite theo-
ries that are a legacy of Max Weber’s analyses of modern elite formation and 
dynamics. These are seen by as an important and frequently overlooked inspi-
ration for modern elite theorising, especially that of John Higley and his col-
leagues. Pakulski argues that both the “classical” Italian (Pareto, Mosca) and 
German (Weber, Michels) theoretical inspiration underlie Higley’s work. We-
ber’s (1978) analyses of modern political elite, particularly its structure and 
specific dynamics, inspired further analyses of contemporary elite theorists, 
especially those that highlighted the importance of elite integration and “ruling 
consensus”, as well as the crucial role played by political leaders and core 
executive groups (“central circles”). While most contemporary elite scholars 
are aware of Weber’s theoretical affinities with the elitist camp, Weber’s com-
ments on the centrality of political leaders, on the importance of elite integra-
tion and on the crucial role of intra-elite cohesion for sustaining a democratic 
political competition are less well known. These, Pakulski argues, need re-
emphasising, if only to highlight both the theoretical continuities and important 
reformulations proposed by Higley and his collaborators. 
In his contribution, András Körösényi complements this theoretical reflec-
tion by highlighting the influence of another prominent elite theorist, Joseph 
Schumpeter. Körösényi’s paper explores the links between elite theory and 
democratic theory through the lens of Schumpeterian “competitive theory of 
democracy” subsequently absorbed within the broader “elite perspective”. This 
theory, Körösényi argues, lays foundations for democratic elitism as elaborated 
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and promoted by Higley and his colleagues (e.g., Best and Higley 2010, Pakul-
ski and Körösényi 2012). In Schumpeter’s interpretation, economic and politi-
cal competition is necessarily monopolistic and destroys “political balance/ 
equilibrium”. The major implication of this inevitable “monopolistic competi-
tion” is the blurring of distinction between procedural democracy and a non-
democratic (“authoritarian”) regime. This is very much in line with the critical 
and “demo-sceptic” tone of elite analyses, especially those immersed in the 
classical elite perspective. Today, it may be seen as a timely warning that po-
litical outcomes do not follow the optimistic scenarios of the “end of history” 
and a “triumph of democracy”. Rather, they are always open, although criti-
cally dependent on the “key elite characteristics” and actions. This seems to be 
one of the key elements of the elite perspective and one of the main general 
formulations of contemporary elite theory that stresses the importance of elite 
normative consensus. 
The theme of elite consensus is also explored by Heinrich Best, this time in 
relation to the “state socialist” or (as Higley and colleagues preferred to call it) 
“ideocratic” regime in the communist German Democratic Republic (GDR). 
This is a combination of theoretical reflection on elite social “reproduction” 
with a fascinating empirical analysis of some unique data-records left by the 
East German regime. The East German “ideocratic elites” legitimised their 
regime by the egalitarian Marxist ideology. Yet, the power structure they 
erected in East Germany was hierarchical, stratified, highly centralised and 
exclusive, with the top personnel enjoying power and privileges similar to 
Western elites. The persistence of this hierarchy, exclusion and privilege sup-
ports the claim of elite theorists that social and political hierarchies inevitably 
continue, even after the abolition of capitalism. This persistence caused embar-
rassment for Marxist-Leninist elites and led to them denying the existence of 
any form of elitism, denouncing such a concept as “part of the reactionary wing 
of bourgeois ideology”. As Best notes, even the term “elite” was regarded as 
improper and replaced by multiple synonyms, such as avant-garde, cadres, 
leaders, and functionaries. Yet, the disparity between the reality and the ideo-
logical “ruling formula” was quite apparent, as the East German data reveal. 
The gender gap was wide, and career opportunities varied according to social 
backgrounds, with some variations between elite sectors. While those who 
believed in the egalitarian credentials of the East German elites would be sur-
prised by the scope and pattern of inequalities revealed by Best (especially the 
impact on political careers of a pre-1945 involvement in National Socialist 
activities), elite theorists would find the picture familiar, confirming Mosca’s 
and Pareto’s anticipations. Moreover, the apparent continuity in backgrounds 
and career patterns of German industrial elites also confirms the observations 
of Higley and his colleagues about “elite continuities” amidst dramatic social 
change that followed the “velvet revolutions” (e.g. Higley; Kullberg and Pakul-
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ski 1996). These continuities, as Best suggests, helped in re-building elite con-
sensus and assisted in negotiating the regime change in a peaceful manner. 
The theme of elite consensus is continued in the article by Tom Baylis – this 
time in the broader context of the democratisation processes that followed the 
collapse of Soviet-based communist regimes in Hungary, Poland, Czech Re-
public, Slovakia and (East) Germany. Baylis subjects both the concept of elite 
consensus and the accompanied theoretical claims formulated by Higley and 
Burton to critical re-examination. In so doing, he focuses on the central claim 
that the emergence of national elite consensus about the rules of political en-
gagement (norms of legitimacy and procedures for resolving political differ-
ences, disagreements and conflicts) is pivotal for the formation of stable and 
liberal-democratic political regimes, and that such consensus, when reached 
through elite agreements, proves self-perpetuating. Baylis examines the role 
played by “round table elite negotiations” and points to the problematic – per-
haps even fickle – nature of their outcomes: the alleged elite consensus. While 
observing the bumpy road to democracy in post-communist Europe, Baylis 
concludes sceptically that the  
level of disagreement among elites over the legitimacy of the political institu-
tions introduced in 1989, and the ferocity of attacks on the right of opposing 
elites even to participate in public life at all, offer a suggestive guide to the 
presence or absence of elite consensus in the new democracies of Central and 
East Central Europe. 
Elite procedural consensus, in other words, especially a lasting ruling consen-
sus, cannot be assumed to be an inevitable outcome of “roundtables”. Rather, it 
is to be ascertained and carefully scoped through nation-specific elite studies. 
Hungarian elite researchers, György Lengyel and Gabriella Ilonszki, make a 
similar point. They critically assess the alleged emergence of such a broad elite 
consensus – as the foundation of liberal-democratic politics might suggest – in 
the more circumscribed context of Hungarian post-communist politics. Their 
attention focuses on the norm-breaching conduct of Hungarian political leaders, 
and the capacity of those leaders to undermine elite consensus, and even going 
so far as to damage the elite settlements of 1989-90. Their conclusion, though 
reached from the Higley-inspired elite perspective, is sceptical of Higley’s elite 
theory, especially its central tenets. Indeed, Lengyel and Ilonszki are quite 
pessimistic in their assessment of the prospects of democracy in Hungary and 
argue that the current (Fidesz-dominated) Hungarian political leaders preside 
over a “simulated” rather than an authentic democracy. Partisan interests 
closely interwoven with private interests dominate and are combined with a 
courting of right-wing extremism. Elite consensus is replaced by the ethos of 
struggle and partisan opportunistic populism, which allows Hungary to be 
described as a case of pseudo-transformation. The authors conclude that elite 
settlement has failed in Hungary and that future elite convergence is unlikely, 
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leading to scepticism about the formation of an authentic, rather than “simu-
lated”, democracy.  
Anton Steen also applies the elite theoretical perspective to his general as-
sessment of political developments in the Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia and 
Estonia). Instead of looking at elite consensus, though, he analyses the more 
empirically tangible elite trust/confidence in political and social institutions. In 
a way that parallels Higley’s claim about elite procedural-political consensus, 
Steen claims that it is elite confidence in the institutional framework (empiri-
cally close to “elite ruling consensus”) that is the key precondition of democ-
ratic rule. He examines elite and mass confidence in the parliament, police, 
private business and the church in three Baltic states following the collapse of 
communism, and concludes that elite’s confidence in new institutions is much 
stronger than mass confidence. This highlights the central role of elites in con-
solidating the democratic order, and is broadly consistent with both, democratic 
elitism and Higley’s theoretical claims. While this conclusion definitely holds 
true for all three Baltic cases, Steen is cautious in his generalization and 
stresses instead the importance of historical contingencies and national peculi-
arities. 
While most analysts treat elite integration, cohesion and consensus as 
largely unproblematic “elite variables”, Gulbrandsen unravels these variables 
through a complex analytic and empirical study. He identifies (after Putnam) 
six “integrative factors” or “dimensions of integration”: social/background 
homogeneity, common recruitment patterns, personal interaction, value con-
sensus, group solidarity and institutional context. Following Higley, he sug-
gests that value consensus is the most critical aspect of elite integration, the 
latter seen as national in scope. An elite is well integrated if its members share 
basic values and derived norms of conduct. Other aspects (factors of integra-
tion), however, are also important. This importance is specified in four hy-
potheses – concerning shared class backgrounds, education, age group/ genera-
tion, and elite tenure respectively – and tested through empirical analysis of 
elite data from Norway. Shared class background emerges as the leading factor 
strengthening elite ideological cohesion. 
Maurizio Cotta explores the similar “Higleyan” theme of elite consensus, 
but he does this in a more optimistic mode and in the context of, “a new supra-
national polity and the complex European system of national and supranational 
elites”. Cotta shifts the theoretical focus from elite relations to more general 
elite-mass linkages. Elite theory, he argues, pays less attention to these linkages 
than to intra-elite relations. Yet the elite-mass linkages – their nature and dy-
namics – must become the key object of elite analysis in order to unravel the 
mystery of the European integration. This integration has been achieved mainly 
“from above” – thus underscoring the importance of the elite perspective – but 
it involved the formation of a specific (though still embryonic) supranational 
elite and supranational new polity. Elites responsible for founding this polity 
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benefit politically from the strengthening of political links. This results in a 
self-reinforcing cycle: the stronger the polity, the firmer the elite positions. 
However, Cotta warns that such a cycle may easily revert into a de-legitimation 
cycle, especially under crisis conditions, when elites fall back on national sen-
timents and identities. Paradoxically, national democratic elites seem more 
ready to accept the strengthening of a similar elite type, than a type that is very 
different (in terms of skills, legitimacy, etc.) from their own. He also notes that 
the central technocratic and bureaucratic elites play a crucial role in building 
new supranational ties in Europe: national political elites are much more reluc-
tant to embrace pan-European identities and solidarities, especially when it 
comes to the political legitimation of important policies. This leaves the prob-
lem of the legitimacy of the supranational polity and its policies not only un-
solved but probably aggravated. More importantly, it also calls for the exten-
sion of elite theory to cover the processes of supra-national elite formation. 
A very similar point, though from a slightly different empirical angle and 
theoretical perspective, is made by Ursula Hoffmann-Lange. She turns atten-
tion to business-corporate elites, and to the claims made by some neo-Marxist 
and neo-elitist scholars that such elites shift in their form and mode of integra-
tion from national to “global”. This is, as the author acknowledges, a conten-
tious claim that requires more theoretical analysis – especially to assess the 
viability of the very concept of elites to tackle such admittedly alleged entities 
as “global elite(s)” – as well as empirical research on the power bases and 
internal cohesion of supra-national elites. If there is solid evidence of “global 
elite” formation, it would require a serious revision not only of the theoretical 
foundation of elitism, but also of the key tenets of democratic theory. Hoff-
mann-Lange highlights the two dimensions of elite and democratic theory that 
are challenged – or perhaps just made problematic – by the new developments: 
the vertical responsibility of elites to their mass constituencies (still seen as 
national in their scope), and the “horizontal” responsibility of elite groups to 
each other, as outlined by the theory of democratic elite pluralism. The conclu-
sions of this review are sceptical and cautious. Hoffmann-Lange finds only 
weak (empirical and theoretical) support for the “global elite” thesis: little 
evidence of “de-nationalisation” of careers and identities of the top power-
holders, and even less evidence of any shared trans-national demos capable of 
sustaining any trans-national democratic elite-mass alliance. She concludes that 
we should not preclude the possibility of future formation of a “global elite”, 
but we should reserve our judgement for the time-being and focus on a task of 
gaining more knowledge about elite formation and transformation. The re-
search agenda set by the leading elite researchers, such as Higley and his col-
laborators, offers the best guide to this knowledge-building. 
Appropriately, the last two contributions – one by Jean-Pascal Daloz and 
one jointly by Gwen Moore and Scott Dolan – go beyond the central “Hig-
leyan” challenge of elite integration, consensus and cohesion, and explore some 
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broader themes of elite competition. Daloz uses the sociocultural cum anthro-
pological framework – the trademark of his studies and inspired by French 
sociological tradition – to examine the issue of elite social presentation. He 
presents a subtle, though quite provocative, reflection on elite distinction un-
derstood as sociocultural distinction through ostentation and/or understatement. 
While shifting attention from political to a cultural-symbolic realm, Daloz 
remains faithful to the key principles of comparative sociological analysis, 
especially those inspired by Higley and his colleagues. But his concern is with 
the ways in which conspicuous ostentation and inconspicuous understatement 
mix in securing and signalling elite status. In many ways, this is an “obverse”, 
the “other side of the coin” of elite studies focusing on elite power, integration 
and cohesion. Elite groups, Daloz suggests, must secure and communicate their 
social superiority, confirmation and affirmation, yet – especially in the modern 
democratic cultures – they have to avoid looking haughty, pretentious and 
detached. Faced with these tasks, they resort to diverse and complex strategies 
of presentation that call for interpretive subtlety and caution against easy (and 
inevitably problematic) “sociologistic” generalizations. 
Moore and Dolan address the gender issue in the American elite. The in-
creasing number of women in American elite raises the inevitable question of 
attitudinal differences. Are women different to men in their attitudes to conflict 
and war? Are they less militaristic and pugnacious then men? The answer, 
based on an analysis of the survey data collected between 1986 and 2004 con-
firms the largely stereotypical view. Both elite and non-elite women are less 
militaristic, less supportive of using force than their male counterparts. But in 
this respect elite women differ less from elite men than their non-elite counter-
parts. It seems that elite socialisation – as suggested by Higley and his col-
leagues – over-rides gender differences and produces quite homogeneous atti-
tudes on strategic issues within the ruling minority. 
What conclusions can be drawn from these very diverse – in theoretical ori-
entation, empirical focus and research style – contributions? First and foremost, 
they show the enormous scope of Higley’s influence and inspiration. The elite 
perspective that he champions has been adopted now on a truly global scale, 
and the theoretical propositions that he (and his collaborators) formulated gen-
erate broad debates. Second, the bulk of the studies in this volume focus on the 
central “Higleyan” theoretical claims concerning elite integration, consen-
sus/dissensus and the social consequences, and on elite dynamics, especially 
the patterns of elite continuity and change. This focus is by no means uniformly 
affirmative – in fact, many authors critically question the neo-elitist theoretical 
tenets. Yet this very questioning, the systematic critical reassessment of elite 
theoretical claims, testifies to the strength of Higley’s theoretical inspiration. 
Only a mature theory and a well-established paradigm can present themselves 
for broad critical scrutiny, and only open theoretical hypotheses – and not 
speculations or orthodoxies – can enter the bloodstream of modern sociological 
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and historical analysis. Higley’s hypotheses, and the propositions formulated 
by his numerous colleagues-collaborators, have become central parts of this 
bloodstream, as is strongly demonstrated by the contributions to this Festschrift 
issue of Historical Social Research. These contributions stand, however, not 
just as testament to the work of John Higley, but also as a tribute to the man 
himself from all his friends, colleagues and collaborators. 
Special References 
Contributions within this Special Issue HSR 37.1: 
Elite Foundations of Social Theory and Politics 
Baylis, Thomas A. 2012. Elite Consensus and Political Polarization: Cases from 
Central Europe. Historical Social Research 37 (1): 90-106. 
Best, Heinrich. 2012. Marx or Mosca? An Inquiry Into the Foundations of 
Ideocratic Regimes. Historical Social Research 37 (1): 73-89. 
Cotta, Maurizio. 2012. Political Elites and a Polity in the Making: The Case of the 
EU. Historical Social Research 37 (1): 167-192. 
Daloz, Jean-Pascal. 2012. Elite (Un)Conspicuousness: Theoretical Reflections on 
Ostentation vs. Understatement. Historical Social Research 37 (1): 209-222. 
Domhoff, G. William. 2012. An Invitation to a Four-Network Theory of Power: A 
New Viewpoint Compatible with Elite Theory. Historical Social Research 37 
(1): 23-37. 
Gulbrandsen, Trygve. 2012. Elite Integration – An Empirical Study. Historical 
Social Research 37 (1): 148-166. 
Hoffmann-Lange, Ursula. 2012. Vertical and Horizontal Accountability of Global 
Elites: Some Theoretical Reflections and a Preliminary Research Agenda. Histor-
ical Social Research 37 (1): 193-208. 
Körösényi, András. 2012. Monopolistic Competition, Auction and Authorization. A 
Schumpeterian View of Leadership and the Political Market. Historical Social 
Research 37 (1): 57-72. 
Lengyel, Gyorgy, and Gabriella Ilonszki. 2012. Simulated Democracy and Pseudo-
Transformational Leadership in Hungary. Historical Social Research 37 (1): 107-
126. 
Moore, Gwen, and Scott Dolan. 2012. U.S. Elite and Public Views on Anti-
Terrorist Military Action: Are Women Less Militaristic? Historical Social Re-
search 37 (1): 223-242. 
Pakulski, Jan. 2012. The Weberian Foundations of Modern Elite Theory and De-
mocratic Elitism. Historical Social Research 37 (1): 38-56. 
Steen, Anton. 2012. Elite and Mass Confidence in New Democracies – Towards 
Congruence? The Baltic States 1992-2007. Historical Social Research 37 (1): 
127-147. 
 19
References 
Best, Heinrich, and John Higley. 2009. Democratic Elitism Reappraised. Compara-
tive Sociology 8: 427-48. 
Best, Heinrich, and John Higley, ed. 2010. Democratic Elitism: New Theoretical 
and Comparative Perspectives. Leiden and Boston: Brill. 
Bottomore, Tom. 1993. Elites and Society. 2nd edition. London: Routledge. 
Burton, Michael, and John Higley. 1987. Elite Settlements. American Sociological 
Review 52 (3): 295-307.  
Domhoff, G. William. 2009. Who Rules America? Challenges to Corporate and 
Class Dominance. 6th edition. New York: McGraw Hill. 
Dogan, Mattei, and John Higley, ed. 1998. Elites, Crises and the Origins of Re-
gimes. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Field, G. Lowell, and John Higley. 1973. Elites and Non-Elites: The Possibilities 
and Their Side Effects. Andover Mass.: Warner Modular Publications No. 13. 
Field, G. Lowell, and John Higley. 1980. Elitism. London: Routledge. 
Field, G. Lowell, John Higley, and Michael Burton. 1990. A New Elite Framework 
for Political Sociology. Revue europénne des sciences sociales 28: 149-82. 
Higley, John, and Michael Burton. 1989. ‘The Elite Variable in Democratic Transi-
tions and Breakdowns.’ American Sociological Review 54: 17-32. 
Higley, John, and Michael Burton. 2006. Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy. 
Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Higley, John, Desley Deacon, and Don Smart. 1979. Elites in Australia. London 
and Sydney: Routledge. 
Higley, John, and Richard Gunther, ed. 1992. Elites and Democratic Consolidation 
in Latin America and Southern Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Higley, John, Ursula Hoffmann-Lange, Charles Kadushin, and Gwen Moore. 1991. 
Elite integration in stable democracies: a reconsideration. European Sociological 
Review 7: 35-53. 
Higley, John, Judith Kullberg, and Jan Pakulski. 1996. The Persistence of Post-
communist Elites. Journal of Democracy 7: 133-47.  
Higley, John, and György Lengyel, eds. 2000. Elites after State Socialism. New 
York: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Higley John, and Jan Pakulski. 1995. Elite Transformation in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Australian Journal of Political Science 30: 415-35.  
Higley, John, and Jan Pakulski. 2000. Epilogue. Elite Theory versus Marxism: The 
Twentieth Century’s Verdict. In Elites after State Socialism, ed. John Higley and 
György Lengyel, 229-41. Boulder CO: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Higley, John, and Jan Pakulski. 2007. Elite and Leadership Change in Liberal De-
mocracies. Comparative Sociology 6: 6-26.  
Higley, John, and Jan Pakulski. 2012. Pareto’s Theory of Elite Cycles: A Reconsid-
eration and Application. In Vilfredo Pareto: Beyond Disciplinary Boundaries, ed. 
Alasdair Marshall and Joseph Femia. Farnham: Ashgate (in print). 
Higley, John, Jan Pakulski, and Włodzimierz Wesołowski. 1998. Introduction: Elite 
Change and Democratic Regimes in Eastern Europe. In Postcommunist Elites 
and Democracy in Eastern Europe, ed. John Higley, Jan Pakulski and Włodzim-
ierz Wesołowski, 1-33. London: Macmillan.  
 20
Higley John, Jan Pakulski, and Włodzimierz Wesołowski, ed. 1998. Postcommunist 
Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Pakulski, Jan, and András Körösényi. 2012. Toward Leader Democracy. London 
and New York: Anthem Press. 
Weber, Max 1978. Economy and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
